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Social identity theory emphasizes the importance of group prototypicality—shared beliefs, norms,
and behaviors within a given group—to foster distinction and cohesion. The most prototypical
member often becomes group leader, which further incentivizes this behavior. What happens when
this dynamic is threatened? In other words, how does a non-prototypical leader affect rank-and-file
group members’ support for that leader and the group? Building off of previous work in self-
categorization theory, I theorize that support for a non-prototypical leader and the group depends
on rank-and-file members’ political and psychological predispositions as well as their relationship to
the non-prototypical leader. The Republican Party serves as a case study to test this theory, as its
members have varying levels of loyalty to Donald Trump (whom I classify as a non-prototypical
leader) and the Republican Party. Specifically, the importance of the “Republican identity” and
tendencies to harbor right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance orientation traits will serve
as predictors of whether or not Republicans express support for Donald Trump or the party. This
study utilizes data from an MTurk experiment conducted on Republicans before the 2018 election,
in which the strength of frames emphasizing Donald Trump’s non-prototypicality are randomized
to understand how changes in perceptions of prototypicality affect support for a non-prototypical
leader and the group they lead.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
When Donald Trump was elected President of the United States in November 2016, he became the
national leader of the Republican Party. Yet, as a candidate, Donald Trump’s behavior was atypical
of Republican politicians: his abortion position flip-flopped, he viciously mocked other respected
Republican leaders, and he embraced explicit racial appeals instead of the strategy of implicit racism
normally characteristic of Republican rhetoric (Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek, 2018). His
character traits also diverged from the highly valued conservative ideal of moral traditionalism
(Lupton, Smallpage and Enders, 2018)—Trump is twice divorced, openly sexist towards women,
and accused of multiple incidences of infidelity and sexual assault. Thus, Trump’s candidate profile
conflicted sharply with the prototypical Republican image established by respected leaders such as
Governor Mitt Romney, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, and now Vice-President
Mike Pence.
Moreover, Donald Trump’s non-prototypical behavior has continued into his presidency. His
erratic public presence on social media and leaked private behavior with his own staff demonstrate a
temper and mental instability that are non-prototypical for any party or national leader (Ahamadian,
Azarshahi and Paulhus, 2017; Woodward, 2018). He continues to use explicit racism in his rhetoric,
questions the efficiency of the federal law and order system (Gallup, 2018), and personally insults
families of military members (Gonyea and Naylor, 2017). He rarely exhibits the sense of decency,
respect for tradition, or morality often associated with Republican elites. Instead, Trump’s traits
and behaviors violate the norms and prototypes of the Republican Party, and leads one to wonder if
rank-and-file Republicans in the American public will eventually shift their support away from the
Republican Party as a consequence of Donald Trump’s non-prototypical leadership.
Specifically, the fundamental question this research addresses is: will the non-prototypical
nature of Donald Trump’s leadership lead self-identified Republicans to withdraw support from
the Republican Party and from Donald Trump? My purpose is to understand how perceptions of
Trump’s non-prototypicality—moderated by messages emphasizing it to varying degrees—affect
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Republicans’ relationship with and perception of their party and leader. Importantly, I argue that
this process is not unique to party politics, but rather is illustrative of a more general process of
how non-prototypical leaders may affect ordinary group members. Specifically, a social identity
theory of leadership (Hogg and Knippenberg, 2003) explains when non-prototypical leadership is
embraced or rejected, when group support is withdrawn, and by whom. I extend this psychological
theory to explain the effects of non-prototypical political leaders.
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CHAPTER 2: PROTOTYPICAL LEADERS AND INTRA-GROUP DYNAMICS
Increasingly, political scientists understand partisanship as a social identity—it is mostly stable
throughout one’s lifetime and is trait-like (Campbell et al., 1960; Huddy and Bankert, 2017; Green,
Palmquist and Shickler, 2002; Greene, 2004; Huddy, Mason and Aarœ, 2015). Keeping with social
identity theory, American political parties are groups with traits, behaviors, and norms that are
prototypical of the group. Individual party members and especially party leaders (Hornsey, 2008;
Tajfel and Turner, 1986) are encouraged to conform to these prototypical elements, at best “a fuzzy
set of features” that clarify “ingroup similarities and intergroup differences” (Hogg and Knippenberg,
2003, 6).
Group prototypes are the foundation for both ingroup cohesion and outgroup distinction: two
important group goals necessary to maintain esteem and attain political and social objectives. Thus,
social dynamics between and within groups motivate ingroup members to maintain prototypical
behaviors and traits—often conceptualized as the average behavior or traits of all group members
(Hogg and Knippenberg, 2003). Members who follow such norms are rewarded within the group
and those who do not are socially sanctioned (Abrams et al., 1990). These incentives to act as
prototypical group members should exist in political parties just as they would for any other social
identity group.
Group leaders often reach their position of power by internalizing and displaying extreme
prototypical behavior (Hogg, 2001). To explain, leader categorization theory (Lord, Foti and
de Vader, 2006; Van Quaquebeke, van Knippenberg and C. Brodbeck, 2011) claims that when
evaluating leaders, ordinary group members measure the fitness of that leader against pre-existing
leadership schema, relying on group prototypicality to judge how well the leader represents the
group (Hogg and Knippenberg, 2003). Specifically, prototypical “depersonalization” within groups
leads members to see the group less as a conglomeration of different individuals and more as one
entity exhibiting the group’s prototype (Hogg and Knippenberg, 2003). The group leader rises to
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their position of power because they often best represent the behaviors, norms, and values of the
entire group and are seen by group members to “embody who we are” (van Knippenberg, 1997).
According to leader categorization theory, the continual evaluation of “leader fit” among group
members should prove problematic for a non-prototypical leader like Donald Trump. His “anti-
establishment” and “outsider” reputation was celebrated by his base during the election season.
However as leader of the entire Republican Party, it should threaten group adherence and support in
many ordinary group members, because it makes him a poor fit for the Republican Party. While he
has gone from anti-establishment outsider to group leader, Trump is still individualizing himself—the
opposite of depersonalization (Hogg and Knippenberg, 2003). Although Trump initially gained
influence because it was assumed he would behave prototypically post-election (Coppins, 2017), this
has not been the case. This compounding divergence from Republican leadership norms means that
Donald Trump should face a challenge to maintain cohesion and support of certain members of his
group.
Having Trump as a non-prototypical leader should trigger different psychological processes for
rank and file Republicans, depending on 1) their political and psychological predispositions and 2)
the reception of messages that Trump’s non-prototypicality causes discord with the party. These
messages are designed to be similar to frames, in that they convey cognitive associations between
subjects and themes and convey what to think about when considering or learning about a given
issue—in this case, is Trump “embodying who we are” or undermining it? A general hypothesis for
this paper is that perceptions of Trump’s non-prototypicality should vary but not greatly—it is
clear to group members when a leader is non-prototypical relative to the group (van Knippenberg,
1997). However, predispositions and messages of intra-party discord should moderate reactions.
Republicans’ political predispositions should matter when considering group support and leader
support because the strength of their partisanship and the internalization of that identity will affect
the salience and perceived consequences of Trump’s non-prototypical leadership, and directly affect
their relationship to the leader and the broader group. Likewise, Republicans who have tendencies
to lean towards social dominance orientation should be more receptive to Trump as a leader, despite
his lack of prototypicality. Finally, how Donald Trump’s leadership quality and non-prototypicality
conflict with the party should have a direct effect on how it is perceived and an additional effect on
how likely Republicans are to openly support the Republican Party and Donald Trump.
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Therefore, this is also a study about intra-group conflict. Some Republican elites—such as Dick
Cheney and Paul Ryan—and ordinary citizens were expressing opposition to Donald Trump when
he was a Republican primary candidate (Ball, 2015; Costa, Schaffner and Raja, 2015). The “Never
Trump” movement fractured the party in such a way that Trump struggled to consolidate favorability
among Republicans thereafter, even up to the eve of the election (Albert and Barney, 2018; YouGov,
2016) Others such as John McCain and Jeff Flake have criticized him throughout his presidency (Fox,
2018). Campaign strategies for the 2018 midterms included Republican candidates for Senate lauding
Trump and his policies, while House candidates were doing their best to distinguish themselves
from the president (Scherer, 2018). Thus, the Republican Party and its members are split in their
reactions to Donald Trump as their leader. In the rest of this paper, I lay the groundwork for this
theory within the existing literature, offer concrete hypotheses, and design a method to test these
expectations.
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CHAPTER 3: STRONG REPUBLICAN IDENTITY AND GROUP ESTEEM THREAT
Republicans who have a strong Republican identity should continue to outwardly support the party
even when the undesirability and non-prototypicality of Trump’s leadership style is made salient
through these quasi-frames. For these group members, “being Republican” is likely to be an integral
part of their sense of self, and fundamental to how they think about politics (Campbell et al., 1960;
Bankert, Huddy and Rosema, 2017; Green, Palmquist and Shickler, 2002; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).
Strongly identified Republicans should clearly understand what the party has represented and stood
for—and what the group prototype was—before the age of Trump, and therefore should view him
as an outlier rather than a true Republican leader. Thus, they should continue to support their
party but show less support for Donald Trump as a “true Republican.”
The idea of “group esteem threat” predicts this response, especially from certain ingroup
members. To explain, group esteem threat occurs when a group’s social standing is in danger
of being compromised, usually as a result of intergroup hostility or negative interactions (Riek,
Mania and Gaertner, 2006). Group members with the strongest ties to the threatened group are
likely to defend it and continue to identify with it in the face of increasing threat (Dietz-Uhler and
Murrell, 1998). It has been argued that Donald Trump’s non-prototypicality is threatening the
social standing of the Republican Party from the inside. However, the group esteem threat may be
treated as if it were coming from outside, because many strong Republicans may view Trump as
an outsider (Beauchamp, 2018). For example, a web search shows the same message coming from
both ordinary party members and party elites—Trump is not a true Republican (CBS News 2018).
Thus, in the face of evidence of Trump’s non-prototypicality, strongly identified Republicans should
be more likely to maintain their own group support, and reject Trump because he is a threat to
the group as a whole. Specifically, by re-categorizing Trump—an undesirable and non-prototypical
leader—as a threatening outsider, Republicans with a strong Republican social identity should
continue their support for the Republican party regardless of how Trump’s leadership is framed.
However, because party support among party members is already high (in modern history in-group
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affect usually hits a ceiling around 70-80%, (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018)), there is unlikely to be
any chance for a positive effect on party support. Thus, I posit two hypotheses. The first concerns
support for the Republican Party while the second concerns support for Donald Trump:
H1a: The group support of strong Republican identifiers will be unaffected by increasing
emphasis on party discord.
H1b: Strong Republican identifiers will be less likely to support Donald Trump as party leader
as the strength of messages emphasizing party discord increases.
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CHAPTER 4: WEAK REPUBLICANS AND THREATENED GROUP STATUS
Social identity is most meaningful when ingroup members feel a sense of belonging and distinctiveness
(Brewer, 1991). So, what happens when a group no longer provides these goods? This could be
the case for weak partisans within the Republican Party, whose party identity is unlikely to be a
priority in their lives because they have not fully internalized what it means to “be Republican” the
way stronger group members have. Additionally, weakly partisan Republicans are more likely to be
“tuned out” from politics relative to strong Republicans (Prior, 2007; Zaller and Feldman, 1992),
leading to a fuzzier idea of the group’s shared characteristics (Otten and Epstude, 2006). Still, the
salience of presidential elections, which often feature the most prototypical Republicans as nominees,
should provide some ideas and cues about prototypicality (Lupton, Smallpage and Enders, 2018).
However, Donald Trump should challenge this rudimentary understanding of the prototypicality of
Republican leaders for weak Republicans, and the media surrounding his divisive administration
may induce uncertainty about what Republicanism truly is, how homogenous the group is, and how
the group will bolster each individual’s self esteem. While strongly identified Republicans likely
respond to Trump’s non-prototypicality by self-stereotyping—using the party to assess their sense of
self—weak Republicans should be more likely to engage in self-anchoring, and thus use their sense
of self to assess the party. This is so because they are less strongly identified with this group and
more likely to view themselves as individuals within it (Otten and Epstude, 2006).
Depending on how Trump’s leadership is framed, these weak Republicans should decrease
expressed support for the Republican Party. This is likely because a lack of perceived homogeneity
and group distinctiveness tends to undermine identification with and commitment to a group
(Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1997). When ingroups become low-status and intergroup mobility
is possible, low-identifiers are likely to abandon their previous group identity (Ellemers, Spears
and Doosje, 1997). I argue that something similar is likely to happen for weak Republicans in
Trump’s party when it comes to supporting the ingroup. The ingroup status has been threatened
and because they were only ever weakly identified with the Republican Party, the costs of expressing
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a lack of support and re-categorizing are low (Klar and Krupnikov, 2016). From this groundwork I
posit two additional hypotheses:
H2a: The group support of weak Republicans will decrease as the strength of messages
emphasizing party discord increases.
H2b: The support of weak Republicans for Donald Trump will decrease as the strength of
messages emphasizing party discord increases.
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND TRUMPISM
Regardless of Trump’s blunders, downfalls, failures, and gaffes, there is a hardcore base of followers
who strongly identify with and support the president. “ReTrumplican” social media pages have
appeared on every platform since 2015, suggesting not only that Trump’s base exists, but also that
they have built an identity group around his brand of conservatism, one that is often in conflict
with the Republican Party. Trump and his followers in this identity group likely exhibit a distinct
psychological orientation: social dominance orientation (SDO) (see Edsall (2017) and Rentfrow,
Gosling, Jokela, Stillwell, Kosinski, and Potter (2013)) . People who measure high in SDO personality
traits tend to value a social hierarchy that treats certain groups of people as inherently superior
to others (Womick et al., 1998), and they often express prejudicial and racially resentful attitudes
(Henry et al., 2005). Trump was the candidate who most embodied the prototypical SDO American,
and thus was best able to mobilize these voters with his inflammatory rhetoric. Americans high
in these traits likely saw in Trump a leader who was expressing their deeply held attitudes, which
encouraged them to form an identity group as Trump’s supporters—often proudly boasting the
label of “Trump’s deplorables” (Sargent, 2018). When given the choice between identifying as more
of a Trump supporter or a Republican, these high-SDO individuals will pick the former (there is a
variable measuring this explained below). While many of these individuals have probably identified
as and voted for Republicans much of their lives, Trump’s embodiment of their personality type
and their new identity group as his supporters should overshadow any allegiance that they would
otherwise show for the Republican Party when it is in conflict with its SDO leader.
Trump is still benefiting from support from this identity group, which likely makes up a majority
of his base (Pettigrew, 2017; Womick et al., 1998). Moreover, Trump’s non-prototypical leadership
style, his unethical and controversial policy preferences, and the positive reaction from his base for
these qualities are consistent with authoritarian leadership dynamics: group leaders who measure
high in SDO are able to behave more unethically when their followers are also high in SDO (Hing,
Bobocel and Zanna, 2007). Because Trump’s presidential rhetoric makes the “ReTrumplican”
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Table 1: Predicted Effect of Labeling Trump as Non-Prototypical
Strong Weak SDO
Support for Republican Party None - -
Support for Donald Trump - - +
identity salient by waging the standard war against Democrats and also calling out Republicans who
do not agree with him or are not as aggressive as him, SDO personalities should support Trump
more than they support the Republican Party as interactions between the two are framed with
more conflict. From this theoretical standpoint, I argue:
H3a: The group support of Republicans measuring high in SDO will decrease as the strength
of messages emphasizing party discord increases.
H3b: Republicans high in SDO will be more likely to offer strong support for Donald Trump
as the strength of messages emphasizing party discord increases.
These expectations are directly contrary to the expectations for strong Republican identifiers
because strong Republicans are likely to choose to identify more as a supporter of the Republican
Party than with Donald Trump (indeed, the correlation coefficient between the SDO measure and
the social identity strength measure among Republicans is -0.17). High SDO Republicans have a
different relationship to Donald Trump as a leader and should prioritize that constructed identity
over their identity as Republicans. In other words, while high SDO Republicans may identify
as a strong Republicans on a standard 7-point partisanship scale, when asked to choose between
identifying as a Republican or a Trump supporter, they should be more likely to choose the latter.
Empirically, my sample does not include many strongly identified Republicans who also measure high
on the SDO scale (see Figures 9 and 10 in Appendix B), but those who should exhibit effects that
fall under the “high-SDO Republicans” predictions rather than the “strongly identified Republicans”
prediction. Below I include a brief summary of the expectations outlined above.
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CHAPTER 6: METHODS
In order to test the above hypotheses I ran a survey experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). It ran before the 2018 midterms, collecting 466 responses between November 2nd 2018
and November 5th 2018. In order to focus on members of the Republican Party as a social identity
group, I used MTurk’s filters, set liberal equal to false. I also advertised the Human Intelligence
Task containing the survey as “for Republicans only.” I then parsed out any respondents who
self-identified as Democrats or Independents. I exclude Republican leaners because they do not take
the opportunity to explicity identify with the Republican Party, and are not asked the same questions
as Republicans because of Qualtric’s display logic in the actual study design. Future iterations
of this work might include leaners in certain measures using display logic, but this technique was
not appropriate for the flow of this particular survey. I also exclude respondents who did not pass
attention checks, leaving the final sample at 306 observations. Although still a convenience sample,
MTurk samples are more representative of the general population than student samples and are
increasingly utilized in the social sciences (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, N.d.). Given the small sample
size, however, it is extremely difficult to generalize the findings below to Republicans in the mass
public. Gaining a larger sample of Republicans who are less unique than MTurk workers is an
endeavor for future research.
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CHAPTER 7: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Respondents answered most of the questions operationalizing independent variables before receiving
the experimental treatment. They first answered a slew of basic social and political demographic
questions including party identification, age, ideology, and education level. Next, respondents
answered a battery of three questions related to the motivation to adhere to group norms (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.832, histograms of each measure can be found in Appendix B). These questions ask
respondents the extent to which they agree with the statements “I almost always vote for candidates
who represent my party because it is important to me” (Q6), “I almost always vote for candidates
who represent my party because that’s how Republicans should act” (Q7, prescriptive norm), and
“I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because that’s what other Republicans
do”(Q8, descriptive norm). Because this is not an established scale in political psychology like
the measures above, I run a graded response model (from Item Response Theory) to understand
whether these questions and the answers to them are identifying an underlying latent trait.
In Figure 1 below, the x-axis denotes the latent trait, motivation to adhere to group norms.
The y-axis represents the probability of giving a certain response to the questions outlined above
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree), and the lines represent those response options as item
characteristic curves—the relationship between the latent trait and observed responses. Interpreting
these plots is fairly straightforward. For example, looking at the first plot in Figure 1, an individual
scoring the highest on the latent trait of motivation to adhere to group norms has a probability of 1
of strongly agreeing to the given question, whereas someone measuring closer to the middle of the
measure—around 1 on the x-axis—has an equal probability of about .5 of answering either “agree”
or “strongly agree.” The plots in Figure 1 below show that as an individual’s motivation to adhere
to group norms increases, the probability of them answering “strongly agree” with the measures is
closest to 1, making this a strong measure of the trait.
According to the theoretical grounding and expectations above, a motivation to adhere to group
norms should only matter for strongly identified Republicans. I therefore model (and explain in the
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analysis below) three way interactions between perceived non-prototypicality, Republican identity,
and the motivation to adhere to group norms.
Graded Response Model: Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms
Figure 1: Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms Question 6
Figure 2: Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms Question 7
The next independent variable measured in the survey is the level of social dominance orientation
of each respondent. This is measured through a shortened version of the standard SDO scale (Henry
et al., 2005) that is common in political psychology, with a seven point likert-type response scale
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Figure 3: Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms Question 8
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix A for question wording). Next,
social identity strength is measured using first a question that asks respondents whether they see
themselves as more of a supporter of Donald Trump or the Republican Party. Based on the answer
to this question they are asked to what extent the Republican [Trump] identity is important to
them and whether they feel a strong sense of attachment to other people who are Republicans
[Trump supporters]. Both questions have seven point likert-type responses ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree. We can infer that results for strongly identified Republicans will be
opposite for weakly identified Republicans because the response measures both poles of this concept
(if one strongly disagrees with these measures, they can be considered weakly identified in the social
identity sense). However I also use the standard seven-point partisanship scale as a measure for
those to explicitly identify as weak Republicans to more specifically operationalize that group.
Next, respondents received the experimental treatment. Respondents were randomly assigned
to see one of three different messages depicting various levels of discord between Donald Trump
and congressional Republicans over immigration. These messages ranged from a purely descriptive
treatment, to a weakly non-prototypical message, to a strong and explicitly non-prototypical message,
basically framing the conflict between the leader and group as a disagreement, an annoyance, or
a cause for outrage, respectively. They were presented in the form of a short news statement 3-4
sentences long, but were not embedded in Qualtrics as a news article. As for the experimental
15
vignette topic selection, the topic of immigration from Mexico seems natural as Trump notoriously
has much to say on the topic, and his preferred policy is much more extreme than traditional
conservative immigration stances. The vignettes clearly set up a realistic face-off between Trump
and the Republican Congress on the issue of funding for the Mexican border wall. Luckily, this
survey was fielded before border security re-surfaced as an extremely salient and uniting subject
for elite Republicans and the party during the government shutdown. This intragroup conflict
is necessary in order to highlight Trump’s non-prototypicality and to set up a stark choice for
respondents who would prefer to support one of these actors over another. As an example, I include
the strongest emphasis of discord (explicit and strong non-prototypicality) below:
“Earlier this year President Trump was publicly outraged with the Republican-run Congress
for not funding one of his main campaign promises–a border wall with Mexico. When a group
of Republican lawmakers wanted increased protection on both borders–but no walls–Trump fumed,
”Who cares about the Canadian border? Those people coming in from that country aren’t causing
our crime and drug rates to skyrocket.” His statement opposes a long-standing Republican tradition
that focuses on all illegal immigration, and targets concern toward the Southern border.”)
The final independent variable is the perceived non-prototypicality of Donald Trump as measured
by semantic differentials. They were measured directly after respondents were exposed to the exper-
imental treatment. The resulting scale is the main measure of non-prototypicality as the questions
explicitly ask respondents to compare Trump to their ingroup. Respondents are asked to “Please
place Republicans [Donald Trump] on the following scales from 1-7:” from “‘modern/traditional,”
“disrespectful/respectful,” ‘immoral/moral,” and “racist/unprejudiced” with values of 1 having a
negative valence and 7 having the positive valence. Perceptions of non-prototypicality are signaled
when there are stark differences between the Republican Party and Donald Trump on these scales,
so I average each respondents’ scores across the four semantic differentials for both the Republican
Party and Donald Trump, and subtract the latter from the former, giving me a measure of perceived
difference between the two objects with regard to the qualities in the questions.
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CHAPTER 8: DEPENDENT VARIABLES
There are two key outcomes needed to test the hypotheses above, both were measured post-treatment.
The first outcome of interest is the extent to which a respondent is willing to support their ingroup
regardless of a non-prototypical leader, measured two ways. This measure is operationalized by
averaging respondents’ answers to two seven point likert-type questions about how likely they are
to vote for Republicans (the Party and Republican candidates) in the 2018 midterms. The second
measure is a standard 100-point feeling thermometer that asks respondents to indicate their affect
toward the party. Though affect is not the same as support, this measure offers the ability to
understand whether the party evokes warm or cold feelings in a respondent.
The second dependent variable is actual support for the non-prototypical leader, as measured by
support for Donald Trump after the treatment. There are three measures I focus on in this paper.
The first is a standard approve-disapprove question, the second is a standard 100-point feeling
thermometer for Donald Trump, and the third is a “fallibility scale.” This scale consists of seven
likert-type questions that ask respondents the extent to which they agree that certain accusations
against Donald Trump are true. For example, “Donald Trump sometimes uses insensitive language
toward women” or “Donald Trump is not a self-made millionaire, he got most of his money from
his father.” Respondents’ answers are coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and
then averaged across all seven items in the scale (see Appendix A for question wording). Higher
values on this scale represent more fallibility, and therefore less support. This then becomes the
final fallibility measure for the dependent variable.
To directly test my hypotheses I first analyze how support for the Republican Party and support
for Donald Trump differs among individuals in the various treatment conditions, using a multilevel
linear model with random slopes and intercepts to account for the differences between groups of
Republicans and treatment groups. I then get into more detailed hypothesis tests of how identity
strength, SDO, perceived non-prototypicality, and different levels of leader-party discord affect
17




I begin with a manipulation check to ensure that the framed vignettes that respondents saw conveyed
Donald Trump’s non-prototypicality by differentiating him from the Republican Party. I included
a measure for this directly after the experimental vignettes, asking respondents “How similar are
Donald Trump and the Republican Party on border control?” with a seven point likert-type scale for
responses ranging from “very similar” to “very dissimilar.” The results of a simple multilevel model
with the manipulation check as the dependent variable and treatment arms as random intercepts
show that the experimental manipulation does not impact the perceived similarity between Donald
Trump and the Republican Party (see Appendix B below). I also ran additional multilevel models
to see if perceived prototypicality was affected by treatment arm, and these results were null as
well. These multilevel models are appropriate because they allow us to incorporate and analyze
differences across groups (treatment arms) and similarities within those groups. A simple regression
of the dependent variables onto the indicator variables for treatment arms also showed a null result
(see Table 9 in Appendix B for these results).
Since the experimental manipulation did not work as intended, I proceed with the rest of my
analyses treating this as an observational dataset and using ordinary least squares and generalized
linear models controlling for treatment arms to test my hypotheses of leader versus group support.
The main foundation to my theoretical argument is perceived leader non-prototypicality. Overall
perceived similarities between Donald Trump and the Republican Party can be tested by scaling the
measures of semantic differentials. I asked respondents to rank Republicans from immoral to moral,
racist to unprejudiced, disrespectful to respectful, and modern to traditional, and then to do the
same for Donald Trump. Using the “psych” R package to calculate the average scores across these
rankings for each respondent, I combined these measures into scales. For example, a person would
be assigned a score of 7 on the Republican semantic differential scale if they ranked Republicans as
“7’s” (most moral, unprejudiced, respectful, and traditional) across the board.
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A simple t test shows that there is a meaningful difference between the way respondents view
Trump on this scale versus the way they view the Republican Party. The difference in means is
1.451, which is captured by the 95% confidence interval [1.216, 1.686]. This lends some evidence to
my main theoretical argument that Donald Trump is a non-prototypical leader, and is perceived as
such. This allows me to use the difference between respondents’ average scores for the Republican
Party and Donald Trump as an independent measure in my following analyses. It also suggests that
perceptions of Trump relative to the Republican Party are salient for many Republicans and cannot
be affected by short vignettes in a survey experiment.1 Therefore my original hypotheses remain
largely the same, with slight updates. Strongly identified Republicans will still show greater support
for the Republican Party than SDO Republicans or weak Republicans, and SDO Republicans will
still show more support for Donald Trump than strongly identified Republicans or weak Republicans,
but these effects will not be moderated by the differential messages received in the experiment. Instead,
they will be moderated by their own established perceptions of non-prototypicality. These updated
hypotheses require two three way interactions: I interact perceived non-prototypicality with my
hypothesized predictors of Republican support (one is social identity strength and the other is the
motivation to adhere to group norms), and separately I interact perceived non-prototypicality with
predictors of Trump support (identity strength as a Trump supporter and SDO scores). I then simply
model a two-way interaction between weak Republicans and perceptions of non-prototypicality.
These interactions are directly testing the theory outlined above: perceptions of non-prototypicality
should matter when evaluating Donald Trump and the Republican Party, but they should matter
differently for different subgroups of Republicans depending on their political and psychological
predispositions. The resulting model can be seen in Equation 1 below:
1The messages in the vignettes may have ultimately failed because they could not alter preconceived perceptions of
non-prototypicality. An improved approach would be to show Donald Trump’s policy views as actually substantively
differing from the traditional Republican preference.
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ySupport = β0 + β1StrongRepublicanIdentity + β2SDO + β3WeakRepublican+
β4StrongRepublicanIdentity ∗NonPrototypicality ∗MotivationToAdhereToGroupNorms+
β5SDO ∗NonPrototypicality ∗ TrumpIdentity + β6WeakRepublican ∗NonPrototypicality + ε
(1)
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CHAPTER 10: NON-PROTOTYPICALITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY
Table 10 (Table 12 for full results) in Appendix B is the regression table for my two models measuring
support for the Republican Party. These models test the “A” subsections of my hypotheses. The
dependent variable in model 1 is a feeling thermometer for the Republican Party. The dependent
variable in model 2 is intention to support Republicans (the Party or candidates) in the 2018
midterm elections, both are ordinary least squares regression models.
In Table 10 we see some weak support for the argument that strong Republican identity is
a strong predictor of support for the Republican Party. For both models, the main coefficient is
positive and significant at the .05 level. However, just looking at the main coefficients, strong
identity as a Trump supporter is an even better predictor of support for the Republican Party. This
could be because of an incentive to vote for the president’s party as a signal of support for the
president himself, which my theory does not take into account. My main interests here are the
three way interactions. Interacting perceptions of non-prototypicality with motivation to adhere to
group norms and strong Republican identity, we see confirmatory evidence for hypothesis 1a: group
support among this subgroup of Republicans is unaffected by perceptions of non-prototypicality
(although the coefficient is unexpectedly negative, it is not statistically significant). Additionally,
increased perceptions of non-prototypicality make weak Republicans less likely to intend to vote
for Republicans in the 2018 midterms, so there is mixed suggestive evidence for hypothesis 2a.
The coefficient for the interaction between the SDO measure, strong Trump supporter identity,
and perceptions of non-prototypicality is also in the opposite direction as expected—the three
way interaction has a positive effect for Trump’s base, even though it doesn’t reach conventional
significance levels. This leads me to reject hypotheses 3a.
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CHAPTER 11: NON-PROTOTYPICALITY AND SUPPORT FOR TRUMP
In Table 11 (Table 13 for full results) in Appendix B I test the “B” parts of each hypothesis,
examining in particular how perceptions of non-prototypicality within each group affect support
for Donald Trump. The dependent variable of the first model is a binary measure asking whether
or not the respondent approves or disapproves of Donald Trump’s job as president. In the second
model, the dependent measure is the fallibility scale explained in the “Methods” section above. In
model three, the dependent variable is a standard feeling thermometer.
Table 11 shows very little support for the latter half of each hypothesis. Looking at the feeling
thermometer ratings, all coefficients are in the expected directions but only the coefficient for
Trump’s base is distinguishable from zero. For the other two measures of support for Donald Trump,
no evidence for my hypotheses can be found. The table thus lends some support for Hypotheses 3b,
with the caveat that non-prototypicality increases support for Trump among his base depending on
how support is measured.
Although most of the three-way interactions did not reveal any more theory-confirming patterns
when plotted rather than with their coefficients read in a regression table, a few suggest that this
theory is worth pursuing with better data and more refined measures of the independent variables.
Figures 2-5 below display this graphically.
23
Effect of Interaction Between Non-Prototypicality, Republican Identity, and
Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms on Republican Feeling Thermometer
Figure 4: Three-way interaction between perceived non-prototypicality (x-axes), strong Republican
identity (RID panels), and motivation to adhere to group norms score (lines).
Figure 4 above offers confirmation that as Republican identity strength increases, perceptions of
non-prototypicality and the motivation to adhere to group norms begin to associate less for group
affect. The plot shows that for the higher level of Republican identity (the right-hand panel) and
for the higher level of motivation to adhere to group norms (the mean plus one standard deviation,
indicated by the solid blue line), warm affect for the Republican Party evens out at about 80 degrees
(Hetherington and Weiler, 2018). This plot also demonstrates that for lower levels of social identity
strength or internalization, perceptions of non-prototypicality and the motivation to adhere to group
norms matter more for boosted levels of Republican support. This is exactly what I would expect
to see according to hypothesis 1a: as perceptions of non-prototypicality increase, the group support
of strongly identified Republicans will be unaffected.
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Effect of Interaction Between Perceived Non-prototypicality, Strong Trump
Supporter Identity and SDO Scale Score on Republican Feeling Thermometer
Figure 5: Three-way interaction between perceived non-prototypicality (x-axes), strong Trump
supporter identity (TID panels) and SDO scale score (lines).
Figure 5 above shows that for high values of Trump supporter identity (panels), and high levels
of SDO (solid blue line), perceptions of non-prototypicality also matter less for group affect, but
the baseline level of support for this SDO group is lower than the baseline for strongly identified
Republicans. Again, we see that for lower levels of identity as a Trump supporter, perceptions of
non-prototypicality and SDO measures actually increase affect for the Republican Party. For the
higher level of identification as a Trump supporter (the right hand panel), lower levels of SDO and
increased perceptions of non-prototypicality are associated with lower affect for the Republican Party.
The higher level of SDO (solid blue line) has neutral association with affect for the Republican
Party for the highest level of Trump supporter identity. If hypothesis 3a was correct, we would see
the solid blue line having a negative slope for all three panels. However, the outcome illustrated in
Figure 3 makes sense, as many SDO personalities tend to cluster in right-leaning political parties
(Henry et al., 2005).
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Effect of Interaction Between Non-Prototypicality, Republican Identity, and
Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms on Trump Fallibility Scale
Figure 6: Three-way interaction between perceived non-prototypicality (x-axes), strong Republican
identity (RID panels), and motivation to adhere to group norms score (lines).
Effect of Interaction Between Non-Prototypicality, Strong Trump Identity, and SDO
Scale Score on Trump Fallibility
Figure 7: Three-way interaction between perceived non-prototypicality (x-axes), strong Trump
supporter identity (TID panels), and SDO scale score (lines).
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Finally, Figures 6 and 7 above show that perceived non-prototypicality matters greatly for
higher scores on the Trump fallibility scale among both strongly identified Republicans and strongly
identified Trump supporters across their interaction terms, respectively (here, higher levels of Trump
fallibility translate to lower support). While I expect this to be the case for Republicans (and
formalize that expectation in hypothesis 1b), I find the reverse of my expectation outlined in
hypothesis 3b. If hypothesis 3b were true, I would expect to see a negative slope on the solid blue
line in the right hand panel, indicating that for high SDO Republicans who have a strong identity
as a Trump supporter, non-prototypicality perceptions are associated with lower scores for Trump’s
fallibility.
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CHAPTER 12: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
While the regression results offer mixed to no support for the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical
section of this paper, the three-way interaction plots suggest that these interactions and associations
could actually be at play to some extent. Additionally, the negative coefficients for the interaction
terms between weak Republicans and perceptions of non-prototypicality reiterate the theory outlined
above. While this is only significant for one measure of group support, the measure is “intention to
vote Republican in 2018.” The fact that there is any effect on this dependent variable (for which
party identification is such a strong predictor (Campbell et al., 1960)) suggests an important role
for leader categorization theory in political parties. These weakly identified group members do
not have strong connections to the group, they see it as less homogeneous, and therefore are less
likely to show support for it when perceptions of leader non-prototypicality increase. This probably
causes them less cognitive dissonance because their identity is not being compromised the same
way strongly identified Republicans’ would be if they were to offer decreased support (especially
in the form of abstaining from voting) for their group. Future research can explicitly measure the
emotions Republicans feel and the associations that come to mind when thinking about their party
and Donald Trump in order to test how much of a role cognitive dissonance plays in this story.
The exploration of how to (or whether it is possible to) differentially frame non-prototypicality
for experiments is perhaps another route for future research. The vignettes I used changed the
wording to describe different levels of conflict between Donald Trump and the Republican Party.
They were not persuasive when it came to varying significant norm violations by Donald Trump
against the Republican Party (Leeper and Slothuus, n.d.). This is an empirical shortcoming of
the experiment. But is it even possible to frame non-prototypical behavior in a way that changes
opinions? This would probably require for the object of the frame to not be salient, so that
respondents could be convinced of egregious norm violations that would be persuasive in a survey
setting.
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This paper takes a psychological approach to understanding how perceptions of Donald Trump’s
undeniable (according to the data) non-prototypicality affects the support that Republicans are
willing to show for their group and the non-prototypical leader. Importantly, while leader catego-
rization theory is certainly relevant to political parties and to the case of Donald Trump and the
Republican Party in 2018, future studies would need to improve on my measures to collect data
that more accurately represent how political parties function as social identity groups. Political
parties are social identity groups, but they have unique goals that may make showing support for a
non-prototypical leader more prudent than outwardly rejecting him or her. In the case of Donald
Trump, strongly identified Republicans are probably satisfied with the tax reform that was passed
under Trump’s administration as well as the two Supreme Court appointments he has secured.
In other words, there are just as many reasons why strongly identified Republicans would show
favorability towards Trump as there are reasons why they would withhold support, because of the
political nature of the context. However, the fact that Donald Trump is attaining political goals for
the party does not mitigate the social esteem threat that he carries. Indeed, the data above suggest
that weak Republicans are already withdrawing support from their group. Moreover, Republicans
would still achieve the policy objectives outlined above with a more on-brand president like John
Kasich or Marco Rubio, especially with a united Republican government. These considerations
suggest the usefulness of policy congruence measures and explicit measures of perceived group
esteem threat that would allow for more nuanced analyses. While leader categorization theory is
not completely incompatible with political parties, the addition of more explicitly political variables
could aid future research.
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APPENDIX A
Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms
The questions below make up the graded response model for the concept of motivation to adhere to
group norms. The response options were on a seven-point Likert-type scale from “strongly agree”
to “strongly disagree.”
I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because it is important to me.
I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because that’s how Republicans
should act.
I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because that’s what most other
Republicans do.
Social Dominance Orientation Scale
The questions below make up the shortened version of the standard SDO scale. The response
options were on a seven-point Likert-type scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” * =
reverse coded.
Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others.
Some people are just more worthy than others.
This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people were.
Some people are just more deserving than others.
It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others.
In an ideal world, all nations would be equal.*
It is important that we treat other countries as equals.*
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Identity Strength
Do you consider yourself to be more of a supporter of Donald Trump or of the Republican Party?
[Response options randomized]
A supporter of Donald Trump
A supporter of the Republican Party
Based on their responses, subjects were then branched into one of the following question sets.
The response options were on a seven-point Likert-type scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree.”
Being a Republican [Trump supporter] is important to me.
I have a strong attachment to other people who are Republicans [Trump supporters].
Experimental Frames
Below are the control and treatment arms of the framing experiment. Each treatment vignette was
meant to place Trump in varying levels of conflict with the Republican Party over immigration.
Control
Earlier this year President Trump publicly disagreed with the Republican-run Congress for not
funding one of his main campaign promises–a border wall with Mexico. When a group of lawmakers
wanted increased protection on both borders–but no walls–Trump explained, ”I don’t care about
the Canadian border. Those people coming in from that country aren’t causing our crime and drug
rates to skyrocket.”
T1: Weak frame, explicit non-prototypicality
Earlier this year President Trump was publicly annoyed with the Republican-run Congress for not
funding one of his main campaign promises–a border wall with Mexico. When a group of Republican
lawmakers wanted increased protection on both borders–but no walls–Trump declared, ”I really
don’t care about the Canadian border. Those people coming in from that country aren’t causing our
31
crime and drug rates to skyrocket.” His statement challenges a Republican tradition that focuses on
all illegal immigration, and targets concern toward the Southern border.
T2: Strong frame, explicit non-prototypicality
Earlier this year President Trump was publicly outraged with the Republican-run Congress for not
funding one of his main campaign promises–a border wall with Mexico. When a group of Republican
lawmakers wanted increased protection on both borders–but no walls–Trump fumed, ”Who cares
about the Canadian border? Those people coming in from that country aren’t causing our crime
and drug rates to skyrocket.” His statement opposes a long-standing Republican tradition that
focuses on all illegal immigration, and targets concern toward the Southern border.
Trump Fallibility Scale
Below are the questions that make up the Trump fallibility scale. Subjects are asked to indicate to
what extent they agree with the following satements. The response options were on a seven-point
Likert-type scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” They were all reverse coded so that
higher scores reflected increased perceptions of fallibility.
Special Counsel Robert Mueller has evidence that Donald Trump colluded with Russian
officials in his effort to win the 2016 presidential election.
During a 2017 White House event, Donald Trump refused to hug a child with special needs.
Donald Trump had an affair with a porn star, Stormy Daniels, and a Playboy centerfold,
Karen McDougal.
Donald Trump sometimes uses language that is insensitive to racial minorities.
Donald Trump sometimes uses language that is insensitive to women.
Donald Trump is not a self-made millionaire; most of his money came from his father.
Donald Trump will be to blame if the Republicans lose majorities in Congress in the 2018
midterm elections.
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Table 2: Correlations between primary predictor variables
Strong Republican ID Weak Republican Trump Identity
SDO -0.170 -0.146 0.278
Adhere to norms 0.399 -0.410665 0.394
Weak Republican -0.095 — -0.184
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of primary predictor variables
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
SDO 306 3.612 1.403 1 7
Strong Republican ID 157 4.887 0.957 1 7
Weak Republican 158 0.5163 0.501 0 1
Trump Identity 149 5.382 1.010 1 7
Adhere to norms 306 0.0357 .955 -2.388 1.870
Histograms of Measures in the “Motivation to Adhere to Group Norms” Graded
Response Models”
Relationship Between High SDO Scores and Strong Identity Scores
Manipulation Checks
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Table 4: Multilevel linear model with manipulation check as DV and treatment arms as random
effects







Num. groups: Treatment arm 3
Var: Treatment arm (Intercept) 0.01
Var: Residual 2.29
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Experimental manipulation check: Multilevel models with Republican semantic differentials









Num. groups: Treatment 3
Var: Treatment (Intercept) 0.00
Var: Treatment : SDO 0.00
Var: Treatment : Trump Identity 0.01
Cov: Treatment (Intercept) : SDO 0.00
Cov: Treatment (Intercept) : Trump Identity 0.00
Cov: Treatment : SDO : Trump Identity -0.00
Var: Treatment.1 (Intercept) 0.00
Var: Treatment.1 : Adhere to group norms 0.09
Var: Treatment.1 : Strong Republican ID 0.00
Var: Treatment.1 : Weak Republican 0.14
Cov: Treatment.1 (Intercept) : Adhere to group norms 0.00
Cov: Treatment.1 (Intercept) : Strong Republican ID 0.00
Cov: Treatment.1 (Intercept) : Weak Republican 0.00
Cov: Treatment.1 : Adhere to group norms : RID 0.01
Cov: Treatment.1 : Adhere to group norms : Weak Republican -0.11
Cov: Treatment.1 : Strong Republican ID : Weak Republican -0.01
Var: Residual 1.23
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
35
Histogram of Question 6
Figure 8: “I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because it is important to
me.”
Regression Models
Table 9: Partial Display of Model for Party Support
Dependent variable: Party Support




Perceived Non-prototypicality(NP) 30.867∗∗ 1.195
(15.268) (0.931)
Trump Identity 11.859∗∗ 0.409∗
(3.561) (0.217)
Motivation to adhere to group norms (Adhere) 2.249 0.972∗∗
(6.696) (0.409)
Strong Republican ID 7.188∗∗ 0.325∗∗
(1.713) (0.105)
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Weak Republican −8.813∗∗ −0.292∗
(2.852) (0.174)
NP:Weak Republican −1.460 −0.200∗∗
(1.639) (0.099)
SDO:NP:Trump Identity 0.773 0.039
(0.676) (0.041)






Adjusted R2 0.395 0.328
Residual Std. Error 16.516 (df = 285) 1.010 (df = 288)
F Statistic 12.598∗∗ (df = 17; 285) 9.756∗∗ (df = 17; 288)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
Table 10: Partial Display of Model for Trump Support
Dependent variable: Trump Support
Approval Fallibility Feeling Thermometer
Logistic OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
SDO 1.016 0.353 4.144
(1.617) (0.304) (5.902)
Perceived non-prototypicality (NP) 1.401 1.424 23.914
(3.614) (0.925) (17.977)
Trump Identity 1.221 0.144 7.859∗
(1.036) (0.216) (4.203)
Motivation to adhere to group norms (Adhere) 2.434 −0.650 21.487∗∗
(1.865) (0.406) (7.902)
Strong Republican ID 0.393 0.046 3.548∗
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(0.509) (0.104) (2.022)
Weak Republican −1.579 0.454∗∗ −9.324∗∗
(0.970) (0.173) (3.365)
NP:Weak Republican 0.269 −0.026 −2.440
(0.430) (0.098) (1.910)
SDO:NP:Trump Identity 0.018 0.041 1.370∗
(0.210) (0.041) (0.798)
NP:Adhere:Strong Republican ID 0.009 0.033 −0.210
(0.180) (0.035) (0.689)
Constant −3.694 2.297∗ 27.041
(6.009) (1.359) (26.442)
Observations 304 306 304
R2 0.406 0.592
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.568
Log Likelihood −92.348
Akaike Inf. Crit. 220.695
Residual Std. Error 1.003 (df = 288) 19.497 (df = 286)
F Statistic 11.579∗∗ (df = 17; 288) 24.401∗∗ (df = 17; 286)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
Table 11: Full Display of Model for Party Support
Dependent variable: Party Support




Perceived Non-prototypicality(NP) 30.867∗∗ 1.195
(15.268) (0.931)
Trump Identity 11.859∗∗∗ 0.409∗
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(3.561) (0.217)
Motivation to adhere to group norms (Adhere) 2.249 0.972∗∗
(6.696) (0.409)
Strong Republican ID 7.188∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(1.713) (0.105)
Weak Republican −8.813∗∗∗ −0.292∗
(2.852) (0.174)
Treatment arm 1 −0.626 0.240
(2.404) (0.146)




SDO:Trump Identity −1.772∗∗ −0.064
(0.866) (0.053)




Adhere:Strong Republican ID 0.241 −0.197∗∗
(1.300) (0.079)
NP:Strong Republican ID −1.081 −0.072
(0.803) (0.049)
NP:Weak Republican −1.460 −0.200∗∗
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(1.639) (0.099)
SDO:NP:Trump Identity 0.773 0.039
(0.676) (0.041)






Adjusted R2 0.395 0.328
Residual Std. Error 16.516 (df = 285) 1.010 (df = 288)
F Statistic 12.598∗∗∗ (df = 17; 285) 9.756∗∗∗ (df = 17; 288)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Histogram of Question 7
Figure 9: “I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because that’s how Republi-
cans should act.”
Table 12: Full Display of Model for Trump Support
Dependent variable: Trump Support
Approval Fallibility Feeling Thermometer
Logistic OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
SDO 1.016 0.353 4.144
(1.617) (0.304) (5.902)
Perceived non-prototypicality (NP) 1.401 1.424 23.914
(3.614) (0.925) (17.977)
Trump Identity 1.221 0.144 7.859∗
(1.036) (0.216) (4.203)
Motivation to adhere to group norms (Adhere) 2.434 −0.650 21.487∗∗∗
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(1.865) (0.406) (7.902)
Strong Republican ID 0.393 0.046 3.548∗
(0.509) (0.104) (2.022)
Weak Republican −1.579 0.454∗∗∗ −9.324∗∗∗
(0.970) (0.173) (3.365)
Treatment arm 1 −0.036 −0.235 −3.040
(0.502) (0.145) (2.833)
Treatment arm 2 −0.652 0.068 −4.118
(0.473) (0.145) (2.814)
SDO:NP 0.034 −0.265 −5.990
(1.121) (0.233) (4.526)
SDO:Trump Identity −0.182 −0.079 −0.528
(0.312) (0.053) (1.022)
NP:Trump Identity −0.559 −0.127 −7.087∗∗
(0.636) (0.155) (3.004)
NP:Adhere −0.102 −0.162 1.795
(0.880) (0.192) (3.730)
Adhere:Strong Republican ID −0.440 0.115 −4.369∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.079) (1.534)
NP:Strong Republican ID −0.051 −0.039 −0.152
(0.223) (0.048) (0.941)
NP:Weak Republican 0.269 −0.026 −2.440
(0.430) (0.098) (1.910)
SDO:NP:Trump Identity 0.018 0.041 1.370∗
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(0.210) (0.041) (0.798)
NP:Adhere:Strong Republican ID 0.009 0.033 −0.210
(0.180) (0.035) (0.689)
Constant −3.694 2.297∗ 27.041
(6.009) (1.359) (26.442)
Observations 304 306 304
R2 0.406 0.592
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.568
Log Likelihood −92.348
Akaike Inf. Crit. 220.695
Residual Std. Error 1.003 (df = 288) 19.497 (df = 286)
F Statistic 11.579∗∗∗ (df = 17; 288) 24.401∗∗∗ (df = 17; 286)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Histogram of Question 8
Figure 10: “I almost always vote for candidates who represent my party because that’s what most
other Republicans do.”
Frequency of SDO Scores For Full Sample
Figure 11: Frequency of SDO Scores For Full Sample
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Frequency of SDO Scores Among Republican Identifiers Above the Mean
Figure 12: Frequency of SDO Scores Among Republican Identifiers Above the Mean
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Table 6: Experimental manipulation check: Multilevel models with Trump semantic differentials as









Num. groups: Treatment arm 3
Var: Treatment arm (Intercept) 1.54
Var: Treatment arm : SDO 0.00
Var: Treatment arm : Trump Identity 0.08
Cov: Treatment arm (Intercept) : SDO -0.02
Cov: Treatment arm (Intercept) : Trump Identity -0.36
Cov: Treatment arm : SDO : Trump Identity 0.00
Var: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) 0.13
Var: Treatment arm.1 : Adhere to group norms : 0.06
Var: Treatment arm.1 : Strong Republican ID 0.01
Var: Treatment arm.1 : Weak Republican 0.31
Cov: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) : Motivation to adhere to group norms 0.09
Cov: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) : Strong Republican ID -0.03
Cov: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) Weak Republican -0.20
Cov: Treatment arm.1 : Adhere to group norms : Strong Republican ID -0.02
Cov: Treatment arm.1 : Adhere to group norms : Weak Republican -0.14
Cov: Treatment arm.1 : Strong Republican ID : Weak Republican 0.04
Var: Residual 1.99
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 7: Experimental manipulation check: Multilevel models with Trump semantic differentials as
DV and treatment arms as random effects
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Table 8: Experimental manipulation check: Multilevel models with perceived non-prototypicality as









Num. groups: Treatment arm 3
Var: Treatment arm (Intercept) 1.04
Var: Treatment arm SDO 0.00
Var: Treatment arm Trump Identity 0.04
Cov: Treatment arm (Intercept) : SDO -0.04
Cov: Treatment arm (Intercept) : Trump Identity -0.20
Cov: Treatment arm : SDO : Trump Identity 0.01
Var: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) 0.14
Var: Treatment arm.1 : Adhere to group norms 0.00
Var: Treatment arm.1 : Strong Republical ID 0.02
Var: Treatment arm.1 : Weak Republican 0.12
Cov: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) : Adhere to group norms 0.02
Cov: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) : Strong Republican ID -0.05
Cov: Treatment arm.1 (Intercept) : Weak Republican -0.13
Cov: Treatment arm.1 : Adhere to group norms : Strong Republican ID -0.01
Cov: Treatment arm.1 : Adhere to group norms : Weak Republican -0.02
Cov: Treatment arm.1 : Strong Republican ID : Weak Republican 0.05
Var: Residual 1.65
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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